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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELE-
PHONE & TELEGRAPH COM-
pANY, a corporation, 




Defendant and Respondent, 
and GORDON RAY, doing business 
under the name RAY TRANSPOR-
TATION COMPANY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 7755 
References to pages of the record are designated 
''R--------------------·'' 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Com-
pany, hereafter referred to as plaintiff, sued defendant 
Consolidated Freightways, hereafter referred to as Consoli-
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dated, and defendant and appellant Gordon Ray, doing 
business under the name Ray Transportation Compay, here-
after referred to as Gordon Ray, for damages to a tele-
phone pole, cross arms, braces and wires located adjacent 
to the highway, arising out of an accident which involved 
trucks and trailers belonging to defendant Consolidated 
Freightways and defendant Gordon Ray. The case was 
tried without a jury. Judgment was rendered for plaintiff 
against defendant Gordon Ray, and for no cause of action 
against defendant Consolidated Freightways. Gordon Ray's 
motion for a new trial was denied. 
, Highway 30 extends westward from Brigham City 
toward Tremonton. During the extraordinarily heavy snows 
of February, 1949, snowplows had left banks of snow ap-
proximately three ( 3) feet high on each side of high:way 
30 west of Brigham City. (R 75, 105) At a point approxi-
mately three miles west of Brigham City a tower holding 
electrical wires was located 11 or 12 feet north of the 
northern edge of the concrete surface of the highway. 
( R 82) Plaintiff's pole was located nearby. The highway 
is straight where it passes the tower and plaintiff's equip-
ment. The concrete surface of the highway at this point 
was 20 feet wide. ( R 68) 
On February 14, 1949, the date of the accident, the 
roads to the east and west were generally clear. ( R 6) But 
near the scene of the accident on account of the terrain 
and the prevailing wind, the highway had varying amounts 
of snow blown upon it for a distance of about one mile. 
This mile-long area extended about ~~ mile to the east of 
the tower which adjoined the highway and % mile to the 
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had drifted most heavily onto the highway in an area 400 
to 600 feet long. (R 22, 74, 106) With respect to this 
shorter area where drifts were heaviest, the tower was lo-
cated toward the western end of the heavy drift, being 50 
to 150 feet from west end of the heavy drift, ( R 33, 7 4) 
and 350 to 400 feet from the east end of the heavy drift. 
(R 33, 74, 110) 
It was the aim and practice of the highway depart-
ment, where possible, to plow a channel 20 to 22 feet wide 
through the drifts. ( R 99) In the area of heavy drifts, how-
eYer, because of the amount of snow which blew into the 
plowed channel and accumulated mostly on the south side 
of the highway, the snowplows had been unable to clear 
a channel all the way over the south side of the highway, 
and in that area the plowed channel was not straight, but 
veered away from the south side of the highway, (R 68, 
98, 99), with the southern side of the channel toward the 
center lane of the highway. ( R 42, 43, 75, 99) 
On the morning of February 14, 1949, the usable por-
tion of the road through the area of heaviest drifts was 
still further reduced in width by a large amount of snow 
which had blown into the plowed channel since the last 
plow had been through. ( 98, 99) The drifted snow was 
30-36 inches deep at the south side of the plowed channel 
and tapered off to the north side where it was very shal-
low. (R 99) 
Except in the area of heavy drifts, the highway was 
wide enough for two lanes of traffic. The width of the 
passable portion of the highway in the area of heaviest 
drifts was no more than 17 feet and probably no more than 
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14 feet. ( R 14, 61, 86) Since the Ray and Consolidated 
trucks were each 8 feet wide ( R 64) it is very doubtful 
whether the passage was wide enough to permit the two 
vehicles to pass. ( R 73, 77, 80, 86, 106, Plaintiff's com-
plaint, paragraph 5) 
William Felton was a motor transport operator for 
Gordon Ray. He had driven heavy equipment of the sort 
involved in the accident, a large truck and trailer, for two 
years prior to the accident. His job was to leave Tremon-
ton about 11 o'clock p.m. February 13, 1949, with an empty 
truck and trailer, drive to Salt Lake City, load the truck 
and trailer with gasoline, and return to Tremonton early 
in the morning of February 14th. 
He had slept in preparation for the trip and awoke 
just before leaving Tremonton in the late evening of Feb-
ruary 14, 1951. He loaded the truck and trailer with gaso-
line in the early morning of February 14, 1949, and drove 
to Brigham City, where he stopped for coffee. Leaving 
Brigham City Felton drove westward on highway 30 to-
wards Tremonton. As he approached the east end of the 
mile-long area where snow had blown onto the road it 
was about 6:10 a.m. He still had the truck in 3rd gear 
and was proceeding at no more than 30 miles per hour. 
(R 41) 
As he approached the eastern edge of the mile-long 
drift area he applied the trailer brakes and slowed down 
about 5 miles per hour. As the trailer passed from the dry 
highway about 150 feet before reaching the mile-long drift 
area the trailer began to skid, so Felton released the brakes 
and gave the truck enough throttle to srtaighten out the 
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trailer. ( R 22, 32) The trailer immediately straightened 
out and Felton drove the truck westward under perfect 
control for several hundred feet. The truck traveled steadi-
ly and nom1ally in a straight line, with no wobbling, weav-
ing or zigzagging. ( 67, 83, 48) 
The vehicle of defendant Consolidated Freightways, 
driven by Mr. Bankhead (who was still employed by Con-
solidated at the time of trial), was a large motor transport 
and trailer, and was proceeding eastward on highway 30 
at 30 miles per hour. ( R 73, 79) The Consolidated truck 
did not slow down. ( R 56, 57) The Gordon Ray truck 
entered the narrow lane first, and when it had proceeded 
westward 100-200 feet into the narrow passage through 
the area of heaviest drifts, the Consolidated truck entered 
the western end. ( R 25, 36, 76, 79) 
In entering the narrow passage the Consolidated truck 
turned to the northern or left hand side of the highway. 
The right hand wheels of the Consolidated truck were on 
or near the center line of the highway. The Consolidated 
and Ray trucks were each eight feet wide. The west bound 
Gordon Ra,- driver crowded to the northern side of high-
way taking about a foot of snow from the bank, in hope 
that the two vehicles could pass. ( R 45) The point where 
the two trucks would have met was about even with the 
tower. The Consolidated vehicle continued on in the 
northern part of the highway in the Gordon Ray lane of 
travel. (R 45, 58, 59, 77, 79, 108) To avoid colliding with 
the Consolidated truck the Gordon Ray driver crowded 
still further to the north, and the Gordon Ray truck ran 
off the highway, coming to rest against the tower ( R 48) 
The Consolidated. truck passed by as the Ray truck struck 
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the tower. ( R 33, 36, 76) Because the Ray truck pulled 
off the highway, the two trucks did not collide. ( R 33) 
The driver of the Consolidated truck had moved to the 
east of the tower by the time of the flash which produced 
the fire. The jar of the truck against the tower broke one 
leg of the tower. An electrically charged wire fell down 
and ignited gasoline fumes from the truck. The fire spread 
first over the truck and then the trailer, and the plaintiff's 
pole and attached wires were burned. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THE FINDING OF THE COURT THAT PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGE 
WAS CAUSED BY NEGLIGENCE OF GORDON RAY. 
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING DE-
FENDANT GORDON RAY'S MOTION TO STRIKE TESTIMONY 
OF WITNESS SACKETT REGARDING GORDON RAY'S SPEED. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THE FINDING OF THE COURT THAT PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGE 
WAS CAUSED BY NEGLIGENCE OF GORDON RAY. 
Findings of Fact, paragraph 5, ( R 11) states that de-
fendant Gordon Ray "negligently drove a truck carrying 
two tanks of gasoline off said highway and against the Utah 
Power & Light high transmission tower, causing the con-
tents of said truck to explode and burst into Harne." Para-
graph 6 ( R 12) states that the foregoing conduct proxi-
mately caused plaintiff's damage. 
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In so holding, the court erred. The record fails to show 
that Gordon Ray negligently drove the truck from the 
highway. The record does show that Consolidated Freight-
ways negligently forced the Gordon Ray truck from the 
highway and that Consolidated's negligence was the sole 
proximate cause of the damage. 
Though the Gordon Ray trailer skidded slightly upon 
leaving the dry pavement, the driver quickly regained full 
control, and maintained control for at least several hun-
dred feet before being forced from the highway. All wit-
nesses who saw the truck stated that it traveled in a 
straight, normal and usual manner prior to leaving the high-
way. All testimony regarding its tracks in the snow shows 
its path to be straight and not erratic. ( R 48, 67, 83) 
Skidding did not cause the Ray truck to leave the road. 
The Consolidated truck and the Ray truck were each 
eight feet wide. ( R 64) The highway through the area 
of heavy drifts was not wide enough for the two trucks 
to pass each other. Mr. Bankhead stated that he had 
passed cars in the general drift area, but he did not say he 
had passed trucks. Tippin, who drove the road twice daily, 
stated that the practice for several days in the heavy drift 
area had been for vehicles to stop and allow oncoming 
vehicle to clear the narrow passage. ( R 77) True, Bank-
head estimated the passage to be 17 feet wide, but this 
was a self-serving statement and was in contradiction 
to Bankhead's statement that he drove as far to the south 
as drifted snow would permit. (R 59, 113) After the 
accident the southernmost wheeltrack was 8 feet from the 
south bank of the plowed channel, and Bankhead may 
have driven further north than that for the southernmost 
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track was not known to be his. Even assuming the orig-
inal plowed channel to be the maximum of 22 feet wide, 
by Bankhead's testimony the width of the passable lane 
through the heavy drifts, therefore, could not have been 
more than 14 feet. Felton, the Ray driver, and Tippin, the 
driver who was following Bankhead, both estimated the 
channel to be about 14 feet wide. ( R 22, 86) Mr. Sackett, 
the patrolman, doubted whether the vehicles could have 
squeezed by each other without taking more snow than 
Bankhead, the Consolidated driver, took. 
It would appear that the law applicable to this situa-
tion is not the rule of Section 57-7-121, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1943, as construed by Patton v. Kirkman, 109 Utah 
487, 167 P. 2d 282. That rule applies only to "roadways 
having width for not more than one line of traffic in each 
direction," but does not have application to situations, as 
here, where the roadway is not wide enough to permit a 
line of traffic in each direction. Where the road is too nar-
row for traffic in each direction the law of the road governs. 
In such a situation the law of the road makes it the duty 
of a motorist reaching a bridge or a passage in the high-
way too narrow for two vehicles to pass after another 
motorist approaching from the opposite direction has prac-
ticall;.' or actually driven into the narrow passage to stop 
until such other motorist has crossed over it and cleared 
the wav. Short v. Robinson, 134 S. W. 2d 594, 280 Ky. 707. 
Rice v: Franklin Title & Trust Co., 184 S. W. 2d 896, 299 
Kv. 142. Kruta v. Gibbon, 21 So. 2d 744, ______ La. App. ------· 
The case of Brown v. Southern Paper Products Company, 
24 S. E. 2d 334, 222 N. C. 626, held that where weather 
conditions had narrowed the road to a 10-foot lane the 
Tight of way belonged to him who entered before the other 
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approached and it was the duty of the other, in the exer-
cise of proper care, to yield it to him, provided conditions 
' were such that he could have observed them had he kept 
a proper lookout. 
The record does not expressly indicate the precise rule 
of law applied by the trial court, but the questions of 
counsel and the court raise the inference that the rule of 
Patton v. Kirkman, supra, was applied in this case. ( R 9, 
83, 105) In. so doing the court erred. The Gordon Ray 
truck had proceeded 100-200 feet into the narrow passage 
before the Consolidated truck veered to the northern or 
lefthand side of the highway and entered the narrow pass-
age. ( R 5, 36, 76, 79) The tower was located about one-
fourth of the distance from the western end of the narrow 
passage and three-fourths of the distance east. ( R 33, 7,4, 
110) Thus, at the time the two trucks met the Ray truck 
had traveled two-thirds to three-fourths of the distance 
in the narrow passage and the Consolidated truck had gone 
only one-fourth or one-third of the way. The Ray truck 
was forced off the highway by the failure of the Consoli-
dated truck driver to yield the right of way. 
On the other hand, even assuming that the passage was 
wide enough for two vehicles to pass each other, and that 
the rule of Patton v. Kirkman did apply, it is still apparent 
that the failure of the Consolidated truck to yield the right 
of way is what caused the Ray truck to leave the highway. 
The maximum width of the plowed channel was 20 to 22 
feet ( R 99) After the accident the southernmost track in 
the drifted snow was 8 feet from the southern bank. It is 
possible that this southernmost track was made by a ve-
hicle other than the Consolidated truck. Assuming, how-
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ever, that the Consolidated truck did make the track and 
that the channel was the full 22 feet wide, there would 
have remained only 6 feet of clear space at the north side 
of the highway for the Ray truck. To avoid collision with 
the oncoming truck and trailer of Consolidated, the Ray 
truck would have been forced to drive 2 feet into the 
northern bank of snow and even then would have had no 
clearance between the two trucks. Mr. Tippin, the driver 
of the truck which followed the Consolidated truck, stated 
that the wheels of the Consolidated truck did not plow 
the snow, that the right wheels of the Consolidated truck 
ran on the center line of the highway and that the Con-
solidated truck was thus in the left hand lane at the time 
the two trucks passed opposite the tower. ( R 79) Bank-
head, however, stated ( R 58) that he did not know he 
was operating into the left hand side of the highway and 
that he didn't pay too much attention to the position of 
the snowbank with reference to the center of the road. 
He further stated ( R 59) that he was not plowing snow 
and that he made no attempt to decrease his speed at the 
time he passed the Ray truck. ( R 57) 
Thus, it conclusively appears, whether the highway 
was wide enough for one or for two lanes of traffic, that 
the Ray driver kept to the extreme righthand side of the 
road as he approached the tower and that the Consolidated 
truck and trailer approached in the wrong lane on the 
wrong side of the road at 25 to 30 miles per hour. The 
Ray driver had to choose between (a) a collision between 
the two trucks which threatened not only extensive prop-
erty damage, but also personal injury and loss of life; and 
(b) steering his truck further into the snowbank. Any 
careful and prudent man would have done as the Ray 
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CONSOLID.ATF~D FRT~IGHTVJ.YS, 
a corpo:r~ t1on, 
Defendar'tt :Jnd Respondent, 
and GBOOOI RAY~ doing business 
under the na-u lUI TRA!iSPOBTA-
!I 0-Jf COM"~ All, 
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7755 
In the f:Jurth and fifth linee from the:~! 
~ bottom of ptJ.ge 11, the_ references to the record :Til 
are incorrect i.n the printed brief. The teatima1!d( 
:·~ 
referred to actually appears OD paces 103 and lOA~,i~ 
or the record, instead of pages 86 s.nd 87, as in-11 
correctly cited in the printed brief. (: 
::1 
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driver did. His driving into the snowbank was an act of 
care and prudence necessitated by the Consolidated driver's 
negligent failure to return to the proper side of the road. 
The evidence therefore does not support the finding that 
the Ray driver negligently drove the truck off the highway. 
:2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING DE-
FE~DANT GORDON RAY'S MOTION TO STRIKE TESTIMONY 
OF WITNESS SACKETT REGARDING GORDON RAY'S SPEED. 
William Sackett, a highway patrolman, who came to 
the accident first as a member of the Brigham City volun-
teer fire department and who later made an investigation 
and report for the highway department, testified as to the 
Gordon Ray driver's speed. The trial was held over twenty-
seven months after the accident, during which time the 
witness had investigated many other accidents. 
On cross examinaiton ,it was revealed that Sackett had 
not seen his accident report, and that his testimony was 
based on a report shown to the witness by Mr. Richards, 
attorney for Consolidated Freightways, who had called 
Sackett as a witness, and that he did not know whether the 
report was true or not. Gordon Ray's objection to this 
evidence was overruled. 
1~.3 
1, tf The transcript shows the following testimony ( R88(" 
:wr}: 
"Q. Did Mr. Felton say anything to you with respect 
to how fast he had been traveling? 
"A. As I remember he said about forty miles an hour. 
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"Q. That is your best recollection-about forty miles 
an hour? 
"A. Yes sir. 
"Q. And you are certain that that question was put 
to him and that he answered it in that manner? · 
"A. I didn't review my accident report-
"Q. But that is your best recollection? 
"A. Yes sir. 
"MR. SCHOENHALS: I ask that be stricken, Your 
Honor, as not being the best evidence. 
"THE COURT: The motion is deni~d. 
"MR. LEWIS: That is all that I have. 
"MR. RICHARDS: That is all. 
"MR. SCHOENHALS: Just a minute. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
"BY MR. SCHOENHALS: 
"Q. Now why didn't you bring your accident report 
with you when you came here? 
"A. I was called yesterday afternoon and asked if I 
would come down. I said I would and so I didn't have time 
to get to the Capitol Building to get a copy of it. 
"Q. You examine quite a number of these people, 
don't you, on things of this type? 
"Yes sir. 
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"Q. And when you speak of that speed there you are 
just. about guessing at it, aren't you, Mr. Sackett? 
"MR. LEWIS: He said that was his best recollection? 
"MR. SCHOENHALS: Just a minute. I object to that. 
Let me cross examine him here. 
"Q. You were just about guessing at it, weren't you, 
Mr. Sackett? 
"A. Since I come down here I seen a copy of an acci-
dent report. Whether it is true or not I don't know. 
"Q. Is that what you made your observation from? 
"A. And I made my observation from that there. 
"Q. You saw a copy there and Mr. Richards showed 
it to you, did he? 
"A. Yes sir. 
"Q. And you made your observation and want to pin 
a forty mlle an hour rap on this man for going forty miles 
an hour by virtue of a piece of paper that Mr. Richards 
showed you, is that right? 
"A. I wouldn't say it was --" 
The witness testified from a memorandum which he 
· bad ~o part in preparing. He did not know whether it 
was true or not. Counsel for Gordon Ray had no oppor-
tunity to examine any memorandum prepared by the wit-
ness or cross examine thereon. Permitting such evidence 
to stand notwithstanding objection of counsel constituted 
prejudicial error. A ruling upholding testimony of a witness 
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based not upon recollection nor witness' memorandum, but 
only upon writings prepared by partisan counsel can only 
open the door to abuse. 
SUMMARY 
1. The Gordon Ray unit entered the constricted area 
first. Since the tower struck was ahnost at the opposite end 
of the constricted area from where the Gordon Ray unit 
entered said area and since it is conceded that the units 
did not collide, the record shows that the Gordon Ray unit 
was in the constricted area first and, therefore, that the said 
Gordon Ray unit had the right of way, and that the 
failure of the Consolidated unit to yield this right of way 
to the Gordon Ray unit, forcing said unit off the road, was 
the sole negligence which caused the damage complained 
of. Moreover, should this court conclude that the Patton 
v. Kirkman case applies, still the record is conclusive on the 
fact that the Consolidated unit failed to share the space 
available, forcing the Gordon Ray unit off the road, which 
failure to share the space available was the sole proximate 
cause of plaintiff's damage. When faced with the necessity 
of either colliding with the oncoming Consolidated truck 
and trailer or of turning further into the snowbank at his 
right the Gordon Ray driver acted not negligently but with 
prudence and care in driving further into the snowbank. 
2. The witness Sackett testified neither from his re-
collection nor from his own memorandum, but from a paper 
shown to him by the attorneys who subpoenaed the wit-
ness. The court's refusal to strike evidence thus obtained 
was certainly in error. It is also certainly prejudicial error 
since the sole basis of negligence, if any, would have to be 
based upon such erroneous evidence. 
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